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CONGLOMERATES AND THE MOMENT OF
TRUTH IN ACCOUNTINGt
HOMER KRIPKE*
We run our economic and financial lives burdened with an error of fact
that is as obvious as it is all-pervasive. We apply mathematical treatment to
business facts, confident that they will generate reliable conclusions just as
accurately as observations of physical facts enabled men to make the compu-
tations that put us on the moon. Thus, we operate with rules like: "A com-
pany with an annual earnings growth rate of 15 percent compounded should
sell for 22 times this year's earnings." But we do this, some not knowing, and
some relying on the stupid brokers and customers who shape the market not
to know, that the basic datum of earnings is not an objective fact but the
product of the accountant's art or artifice.'
Similarly, the whole science of economics has become increasingly
mathematical, with learned authors taking twenty pages bristling with
calculus formulae or feedback diagrams to explain how they built their
"models," before they disclose what they are about to discuss 2 - and again,
many of the statistical raw materials of the computation are the products of
the accountant's artistic imagination.
The conglomerate phenomenon presents these aspects of life in such a
concentrated form that it has caused many to realize or finally to admit what
should have been obvious before; but, unfortunately, there is indication
that it will not force the basic decisions that would be necessary to stop this
fantastic fallacy that our edifice of economic and financial statistics is built
on distorted images, behind which there may be no reality.
I
To avoid misunderstanding, let us make clear that it is not accountants'
fault that economic or accounting data cannot be measured like physical
facts with scientific instruments. These data do not exist in nature; they
are man-made, and man can make any rules governing them that he chooses.
t To aid the reader the following short forms of citation have been utilized through-
out this section:
1. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants will be referred to as the
AICPA.
2. The Accounting Principles Board's Statements will be cited as APB STAT.
3. The Accounting Principles Board's Opinions will be cited as APB Op. No.
4. Accounting Research Studies will be cited as ARS No.
' Professor of Law, New York University. A.B., University of Michigan, 1931; J.D.,
University of Michigan, 1933.
1 See, e.g., Taussig, Combinations, Permutations, and Pooling, p. 846 infra, and his
discussion of the AMK case.
2 See, e.g., ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION Or CORPORATE SrCURITIES (H. Manne
ed. 1969).
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The sore point is that it is taking so long to agree on the rules. Two obser-
vations must be made here.
A. Who should make the rules? We must first distinguish between the
techniques of bookkeeping and the principles of accounting. The technique
of double-entry bookkeeping is a magnificent achievement that will, with
marvelous flexibility and accuracy, process any data that are fed into it.
It is as wonderful in its way as a computer, but like the computer, it is
subject to the principles of GIGO - "garbage in, garbage out." The pro-
cessed results are no better than the raw data that are given to the system.
Shaping the raw data of economic life into the dollar figures of accountancy
is the function of "accounting principles"; but there is no reason to suppose
that the accountant is the only, or the best, judge of how we are to formu-
late the dollar symbols for real life. It is not only an accountant's problem
to decide whether accelerated depreciation or straight-line depreciation best
reflects the expiration of costs of fixed assets. It is not only an accountant's
problem to decide whether an earnings statement will be most useful if we
take the annual expense of depreciation as a percentage of historical cost
or as a percentage of the current value of the asset that is consumed. Ac-
counting principle is too important to be left exclusively to accountants.
Yet, a distinguished accountant assailed another accountant member of a
committee on which I recently served when the latter suggested that an
accounting principle should jibe with the state of the law:
I am not clear on why it is necessary to check with legal counsel.
Isn't our objective to develop the right accounting principle? What
happens under corporate law is another matter entirely.3
Accountants have claimed the privilege of determining accounting
principle with scarcely any consultation with other disciplines which, in my
opinion, should be equally entitled to a voice as to how our economic
activity is to be symbolized in dollars. The Accounting Principles Board
has no members other than accountants. Nine years ago, I urged that the
pooling and goodwill problems were not exclusively accounting problems,
and should be restudied by a committee with a broader base.4 The recom-
mendation was ignored and the Research Studies5 were planned, made and
completed exclusively by accountants with only ex post facto invitations
for suggestions from other groups.
B. In a manner totally inconsistent with its pretensions as the sole
arbiter of accounting principle, the accounting profession (except for the
limited group of pronouncements of the Accounting Principles Board and
its predecessor) has ceded control of accounting principle to the group least
3 Confidential Letter to Homer Kripke.
4 See Kripke, A Good Look at Goodwill in Corporate Acquisitions, 78 BANKING L.J.
1028 (1961).
5 Catlett & Olson, Accounting for Goodwill, ARS No. 10 (1968); Wyatt, A Critical
Study of Accounting for Business Combinations, ARS No. 5 (1963).
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interested in the development of a sound and consistent body of principles:
clients interested in putting their best foot forward.
This astonishing result stems from the rule that financial statements of
a company are primarily the responsibility of management, and that the
.'certifying" accountant must express the opinion that the statements fairly
present the condition of the company and the result of operations in ac-
cordance with "generally accepted accounting principles" (g.a.a.p.) if there
is substantial authoritative support for the principles followed. Simplifying
somewhat, this means that unless the question falls within the relatively
few problems for which the Accounting Principles Board has prescribed or
proscribed an accounting treatment, any treatment, and as many treatments
as sizable groups of corporate managers choose to follow, is within g.a.a.p.,
and may, and must, be certified by the accountant. Thus the same account-
ant can, and does, certify totally inconsistent treatments by different clients
as being in accordance with g.a.a.p. So long as this situation exists as widely
as it does, accounting results will not be comparable, will be subject to
manipulation 6 and will remain a trap for the unsophisticated.
It is obvious that some accountants like things this way. The ac-
countant's responsibility is minimized if he can justify his certification as
being in accord with g.a.a.p. because his client's version of the facts is no
worse (or just a shade worse) than a reasonable number of other companies'
versions of the facts of economic life. Fully twenty-five years ago, the writer
reviewed what is still an influential book of accounting essays, and con-
cluded that the author's recurring explanations that accounting principles
could not be unified in area after area added up to: "the whole philosophy
... in favor of a degree of flexibility so great as to leave the accountant ir-
responsible because no norms are left to which he must conform."7
One can understand and sympathize with the accountants' fearfulness.
The same abyss of open-end liability to the public that caused Chief Judge
Cardozo in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.s to draw back from his
recognition of liability for negligent misrepresentation 9 must still give the
accountants pause. But Cardozo's policy decision was overridden by Con-
gress in the federal securities acts; 10 and it is incredible that so many ac-
countants could have been found to testify that the accounting in the
United States v. Simon (Continental Vending)" case did not violate
6 See note I supra.
7 Kripke, Book Review, 53 YALE L.J. 825, 829 (1944).
8255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
9 See, e.g., Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat'l Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930);
International Prod. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927); Glanzer v.
Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
10 See, e.g., Escott v. Bar-Chris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Fischer v. Kletz, 226 F, Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Kurland, Accountant's Legal
Liability, Ultramares to Bar-Chris, 25 Bus. LAw. 155 (1969). As will be seen, I do not
agree with Mr. Kurland's disapproval of United States v. Simon. See note 11 infra and
accompanying text.
11 CCH FEn. SEc. L. RaP. 92,511 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 1969).
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accounting principle because there was no pronouncement of the Account-
ing Principles Board which required disclosure of the obviously material
facts which the accountants knew. Judge Friendly's conclusion is obviously
sound, i.e., that "fairly presents" in the accountants' certificate means some-
thing objective on which persons other than accountants may have a view,
and not (if the witnesses were to be believed) the present shockingly low
level of g.a.a.p.
How did accountants get that way? One answer is still valid 25 years
after the writer proffered it in another situation in which the profession
found nothing wrong with the performance of one of its leading firms12
after the SEC had declared:
We should have hesitated to criticize the accountants on individual items
had we not been unequivocally satisified that the financial statements,
looked at as a whole, were not truthfully informative and should never
have been certified. 13
The writer's explanation in Associated Gas and Electric Co.,1 4 and now
again in Continental Vending, was that "the Council members, called to sit
in judgment upon a colleague, were thinking, 'but for the grace of God,
there go I.' "15
But accountants are as honorable as any other professional group. The
shocking deterioration of standards in the abuse of pooling and related
matters, documented in Professor Abraham J. Briloff's writings' 6 as well as in
several of the papers herein, seems to show the profession as men with back-
bones of over-cooked spaghetti. But the problem is not personal or peculiar
to this profession; it is the murderous pressure to which accountants are
subjected by clients under the anomalous situation mentioned-that the
laymen interested in achieving a result to suit themselves, who don't give a
damn about accounting principle, are permitted to select the accounting,
and then demand a certificate because their antics are not much worse than
those which other accountants have certified for other clients. There can
be no general progress in accounting until the accountant puts his own
integrity on the line unmistakably by certifying that the principles used
are those that he (not his client) deems appropriate on the facts. Judge
Friendly's opinion in Continental Vending ought to point the way, but it
has aroused only sullen resentment, not movement toward this view of the
accountant's obligation.
12 See Report of Action of the Council of the American Institute of Accountants
in the Matter of Associated Gas and Electric Company, 77 J. ACCOUNTANCY 162 (1944).
13 Associated Gas and Elec. Co., 11 S.E.C. 975, 1058 (1942).
14 11 S.E.C. 975 (1942).
15 Kripke, supra note 7, at 828 n.12.
16 See, e.g., Briloff, Out of Focus, BAlulON'S, July 28, 1969, at 5; Briloff, The "Funny-
Money" Game, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-June 1969, at 73; Briloff, Much-Abused Goodwill,
BARRON'S, April 28, 1969, at 3; Briloff, Dirty Pooling: How to Succeed in Business With-
out Really Trying, BARRON'S, July 15, 1968, at 1; Briloff, Distortions Arising From Pool-
ing-of-Interests Accounting, FIN. ANALYSTS J., March-April 1968, at 71; Briloff, Dirty
Pooling, 42 ACCOUNTING REV. 489 (1967).
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II
The pooling and goodwill controversies, as Messrs. Wyatt and Spacek
note in their article herein, are not peculiar to conglomerates, but they are
highlighted by the frequency of acquisitions by conglomerates. These prob-
lems literally throw into question the whole structure of modern accounting.
The questions are incredibly difficult and the writer does not pretend to
have the answers. But the first step in searching for an answer that will
endure is to state the problem meaningfully, without jargon. Prior at-
tempts17 to state these problems were not meaningful, because they posited
two separate types of business combinations, for which purchase accounting
and pooling are respectively appropriate. Then they sought to state "tests"
to distinguish the two. The tests were rapidly eroded, as they failed to deal
with reality or define the problem meaningfully. The draft solution being
formulated by the Accounting Principles Board will be no more successful,
because it again refuses to state the problem. The Board correctly recognizes
that there are not two classes of corporate combinations different in nature,
for- which different principles of accounting are appropriate. It therefore
first proposed to abolish pooling, and, at last reports, will preserve pooling
on a basis so severely limited as to satisfy neither those who demand preser-
vation of pooling, nor those who want pooling totally eradicated. Despite
the apparent support in the Stanger, Taussig and Hill articles, herein, for
an effort to state a proper field for pooling, I question whether tests to
distinguish the nature of pooling transactions can be successful. The APB's
"exposure draft" is filled with learned assertions about standard accounting
principles, and never views the problem with a breadth sufficient to relate
the problem and the accounting to the modem world.
The problem, it is submitted, is clear, and deserves the type of meaning-
ful presentation it is accorded in the Seidler article, even if the answers are
not apparent. Value is recognized as the present worth of future earnings.
We have a modern "conglomerate" phenomenon of aggregates of earning
assets moving from one ownership to another, as the acquirer seeks to better
its earnings per share; and the question is simply whether the earnings of
the acquired company can be preserved in the transfer or are destroyed by
accounting rules. There are two aspects to this problem:
A. Fixed assets are accounted for at historical cost to the owner re-
gardless of subsequent general inflation' s or increase in comparative value.
Historical cost determines the level of depreciation charges affecting earnings
reported pursuant to g.a.a.p. on the acquired company's books. If purchase
17 See, e.g., AICPA, Business Combinations, ARB No. 48 (1957).
18 See AICPA, Financial Statements Restated for General Price-Level Changes, APB
STAT. Op. No. 3 (1969). These "price level" statements would at best be supplemental, and
necessarily so, for they would dearly be beyond the comprehension of the layman
already bewildered by the financial history of a modern dynamic company. Moreover,
in many cases, the problem of disjunction of earnings after an acquisition arises be-
cause of the comparative inflation (beyond price-level changes) of building and natural
resources values.
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accounting is followed on the acquisition, the increased values must be
recorded as new costs under g.a.a.p., and the increased depreciation charges
destroy the earnings. Accounting must be wrong one time or the other, for
accounting does not make sense in the modern world where the same assets
and the same operations produce different earning results in the acquiring
company's hands and in the acquired company's hands because deprecia-
tion charges change. Either pooling must be permitted to preserve the old
costs in stock acquisitions, or depreciation charges in the hands of the
acquired company must be based on current values, so that depreciation
will not be disrupted following a transfer.19 The Wyatt and Spacek article,
herein, discusses this point admirably. The heightened inflation and this
problem of shifting ownerships must force accounting to face this problem
soon.
B. A modern acquisition is frequently at a price higher than even
current values of specific tangible assets. The excess is called "goodwill", or
a mixture of intangibles. It obviously represents the earning power or going
concern value of the assets in productive process, rather than as individual
resources. The going concern values arose from trial and error, correction
of mistakes, ironing out of "bugs," seasoning, experimenting with men until
there was a good team, etc. These values are genuine, but they are never
recorded as assets on the books of the acquired company because the costs
were immediately expensed to operations. In purchase accounting the
acquisition puts them on the books of the acquiring company as goodwill,
where they again hurt earnings if the goodwill is amortized.
Professor William A. Paton, Sr. has long called for a further study of
intangibles.2 0 This problem will never be solved by broad pronouncements
about classes of goodwill as in the present stage of accounting pronounce-
ments in Chapter 5 of Accounting Research Bulletin 43,21 but only by re-
study of the accounting for the expenditures that build goodwill which are
19 The writer played a small part in accounting's present adherence to the cost
principle on fixed assets. See Kripke, Accountant's Financial Statements and Fact-Finding
in the Law of Corporate Regulation, 50 YALE L.J. 1180 (1941). This article arose from
the writer's participation in an SEC staff level committee study of the problem, at which
time the SEC firmly set its face against appraisals of fixed assets. The writer reasoned
that the balance sheet is basically a repository of costs not yet charged to operations,
and that therefore, the balance sheet should show the historical costs which would
subsequently go through the income account during operations. But query whether the
true depreciation expense of today's operations is a fraction of historical cost of fixed
assets, or is a fraction of the present value (and foregone opportunity for sale) that
expires in operations.
20 See Professor Paton's comments to ARS No. 10, supra note 5. His approach
seems much more sound to me than that of the Arthur Andersen firm, whose argument
as to whether goodwill is a resource or a dissipation of stockholders' equity seems to me
to be mere verbalism. This viewpoint appears herein in the article by Messrs. Wyatt and
Spacek of that firm, and in ARS No. 10, written by Messrs. Catlett and Olson of
that firm.
21 AICPA, Restatement and Revision of Accounting Research Bulletins, ARB No.
43 (1953).
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treated as exclusively current expenses without a surviving asset on the
books of the acquired company, and by restudy of the accounting for
acquired goodwill which is preserved by continuing expenditures after an
acquisition.
CONCLUSION
Beyond these specific questions is the need to rethink the fundamental
accounting concept, that it accounts for entities, so that it is perfectly proper
to have a disjunction when the assets are transferred from one entity to
another. This was perfectly appropriate thinking for individual assets. It
is simply inadequate under modern conditions where emphasis is on earn-
ings, and going producers of earnings - "profit centers" - are transferred
with dizzy frequency.
These problems are not easy. The problems of estimating and revising
values are staggering. But the way to solve problems is to face them, by a
reexamination of principles that creak of obsolescence, instead of concealing
them by mere reassertion of the principles, as the coming pronouncement of
the Accounting Principles Board shows promise of doing.
